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As usual the authors have divided their labor, based on expertise.
In particular, the economic analysis in section 4 was the responsibility
of Damien Neven; Robert Howse’s own understanding of the costs
and benefits of international trade law rules with respect to intellectual
property protection in general depends on a rather different framework
for analysing the problem. However, in so far as the legal and economic
analysis of the Havana Club case itself is concerned, which deals only
with trademarks as a form of IP protection, the authors are in
agreement.
1 Introduction
The first part of the chapter (section 2) summarizes the facts of the case
and the decision taken by the Appellate Body (AB). We emphasize two
issues that the AB dealt with, namely the extent to which the TRIPs may
contain a substantive obligation to grant protection to a trademark
registered in another country andNational Treatment. Section 3 discusses
the notion of trademarks, the trade-offs involved in protecting trade-
marks and the extent to which trademark protection should be coord-
inated across jurisdictions. We observe that there is a strong case in favor
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of trademark protection in terms of alleviating moral hazard and adverse
selection in product choices but we also identify instances where trade-
mark protection can be abused. We also observe that the case for coord-
ination across jurisdictions is less compelling for trademarks than other
forms of intellectual property. We find that the international law of
trademark protection is generally reflective of this insight, achieving
only a minimum of harmonization and imposing constraints mainly
when there is a significant external effect that would not be otherwise
internalized, namely where the interests of foreigners are at stake.
Section 4 highlights and discusses the extent to which the AB has
limited the scope for harmonization of trademark provisions across
WTO Members and in particular has rejected the positive integration
that would be induced by some mutual recognition of trademark provi-
sions across countries. Section 4 takes a broader perspective and discusses
how national treatment affects firms’ incentive to set intellectual property
rights and the outcome that arises when national treatment applies. This
outcome is compared with that which arises under alternative policy
regimes and in particular under independent setting of IP rights for
domestic and foreign holders and under mutual recognition. It is found
that National Treatment is not as attractive as in other areas (like those
covered by Art. III) and that mutual recognition, which has been rejected
by the AB even in a limited form, has attractive features.
2 Facts and procedure
After initial consultations in 1999, the European Communities requested in
2002 the establishment of a panel to consider its complaint that a particular
section (Section 211) of a US law, the ‘‘Omnibus Appropriation Act of
1998’’, was inconsistent with certain obligations of the US under the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the
TRIPs agreement).
Section 211 deals with trademarks, trade names, and commercial
names that are the same as or substantially similar to trademarks, trade
names, or commercial names that were used in connection with busi-
nesses or assets that were confiscated by the Cuban Government on or
after 1 January 1959 (see panel report, x 2.1).
In the US, all transactions involving property in which a Cuban
national has an interest require a license from the ‘‘Office of Foreign
Assets Control’’ (OFAC). This office implements a specific regulation
on the control of Cuban assets (the Cuban Asset Control Regulation, or
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CACR). The office can provide ‘‘general licenses’’ which effectively allow
transactions that are specified in the regulation on Cuban assets.
Up until the promulgation of the law under dispute, a general license
was available for the registration and renewal of trademarks previously
owned by Cuban nationals, independently of whether trademarks had
been confiscated. In other words, Cuban nationals could obtain trade-
mark protection in the US.
The new law (Section 211) stipulates that no payment should be made
with respect to trademarks that were used in connection with confiscated
assets (part (a1)) and that no US court should grant rights to a Cuban
national with respect to these trademarks (section (a2)). The CACR was
then changed to reflect these new provisions and effectively prohibited the
registration of and renewal of trademarks or trade names that were used
in connection with confiscated assets unless the original owner of the
mark has explicitly consented.
Hence, the effect of the new law, and subsequent changes in the CACR,
is to deny to trademarks used in connection with confiscated assets the
protection that is normally granted under US law.
Since in the US trademark protection is effected through common law
(when associated with use) as well as statutes, Section 211 also contained
a provision (b) which prevented US courts from enforcing protection of a
trademark used in connection with confiscated assets on the basis of
common law (the Trademark Act of 1946 – also known as the Lanham
Act).
The (numerous) claims put forward by the EU can be sorted out
broadly in four categories. The first category relates to the obligations
that Members have under the TRIPS to grant protection to trademarks
held by foreigners. The EU found three interpretations of TRIPS provi-
sions which would contain such obligation.
First, the European Communities claimed that the Paris Convention
(incorporated into TRIPs in this respect) contained an obligation to
register and protect trademarks in the same condition (‘‘as is’’) as in the
original country of registration and hence that Section 211, which did not
allow for the registration in the US of some trademarks as they are in
Cuba, was inconsistent with this obligation.Much of the discussion by the
panel focused on what should be understood by the same condition (‘‘as
is’’). The panel found that it only referred to the form of the trademark.
The EU appealed this finding.
Second, the European Communities claimed that Article 15 of the
TRIPS stipulates a right to have a trademark protected, unless the decision
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not to protect falls within the scope of the exceptions and hence that
Section 211 is in breach of this obligation (as it does not fall within the
exceptions). The panel disagreed with the EU’s reading of Article 15 and
found that Section 211 was not inconsistent with Art. 15. The EU appealed
this finding.
Third, the EU claimed that Section 211 was inconsistent with Article 16
of the TRIPs, which confers a substantive right to the owner of a mark to
exclude third parties from using it when there is a substantial risk of
confusion for consumers, because under Section 211, US courts cannot
protect trademarks owned by Cuban nationals. The panel found that the
EU had not met its burden of proof on this issue. The EU appealed this
finding.
The second broad issue covered by the claims of the EU relates to
national treatment and most favored nation clauses. The EU claimed that
Section 211 was inconsistent with the national treatment obligation
contained in Article 3 of the TRIPs and the most favored nation clause
found in Article 4. The panel disagreed and the EU appealed those
findings.
The third broad issue has to do with procedural rights. The EU claimed
that Section 211 is inconsistent with Article 42 of the TRIPs, which
requires WTO Members to establish fair judicial procedures concerning
the enforcement of intellectual property rights. The panel accepted this
claim.
Finally, the EU cast its claims both with respect to trademarks and trade
names. The panel ruled that trade names were excluded from the TRIPs.
The EU appealed.
Overall, this case thus raises essential issues of interpretation of the
TRIPs and the AB ruling has diverged from the panel on important
aspects. Broadly speaking, the AB has affirmed the panel on the first
issue, namely the extent to which WTO Members have the obligation to
register trademarks. The AB limited the scope of these obligations and
effectively ruled out mutual recognition. However, the AB reversed the
panel findings with respect to national treatment andMFN – emphasizing
their importance. Finally, the AB made it clear that trade names were
covered by the TRIPs.
3 Background
This section discusses the social and economic functions of trademark
law (section 3.1) and international trademark rules (section 3.2).
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Section 3.3 then considers the positive international law of trademark
protection.
3.1 Social and economic functions of trademarks
The economic literature of trademarks is relatively limited. Landes and
Posner (2003) emphasize the role of trademarks in reducing search cost
for consumers.1 They define a trademark as a ‘‘word, symbol or other
signifier used to distinguish a good or service produced by one firm from
the goods and services of other firms.’’ They emphasize that a trademark
allows for easier recognition and communication – effectively a short-
hand way of recognizing a particular product (such that for instance, it is
simpler to refer to ‘‘Sanka’’ than describe ‘‘the instant coffee which is
produced by General Foods,’’ to use their own example). These authors
also point to the interplay between trademarks and the incentive to
provide (or increase) quality, suggesting that ‘‘the benefit of trademarks
in reducing consumer search costs requires that the producer of a trade-
marked goodmaintain a consistent quality over time and across consumers.
Hence, trademark protection encourages expenditures on quality.’’
This argument can possibly be made a little more precise by referring to
explicit models of quality choice2 with asymmetric information, and in
particular the literature on experience goods.3 Experience goods are such
that consumers only know the characteristics (or quality) of a product
after they have consumed it. In those circumstances, repeat purchases will
play an important role, as long as consumers can recognize the product
that they have already bought when they contemplate additional pur-
chases. Repeat purchase will help alleviate problems of moral hazard and
adverse selection. Consider first the latter: firms selling high quality
products may be able to induce consumers to try out their products by
offering a low price for initial purchases, and charge a higher price when
consumers have learned the quality of the product. This strategy will work
(at a, so called, separating equilibrium) as long as firms selling low quality
product do not have an incentive to mimic the behavior of the high
1 See also Landes and Posner (1987).
2 Landes and Posner ((1987) and (2003)) do provide a model which is however not best
suited to tackle the issue of the role of trademarks as it is a static model, and hence does
not account for consumers’ learning about product attributes.
3 The models and results that we will use in the following paragraphs are standard in the IO
literature. A detailed description can be found in any graduate textbook.
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quality firms. Whether this condition holds depends on the relative cost
of providing low and high qualities and the margin that can be earned
from selling high quality products at high prices when consumers have
ascertained quality. However, for the mechanism to operate at all, it is
necessary that consumers should recognize in later purchases the pro-
ducts that they have initially bought4 (something which is taken for
granted by the literature). Trademarks will of course be instrumental in
ensuring easy recognition. Trademark protection will also be necessary
because firms selling low quality products will have an incentive to
disguise their products to make them look like the high quality item
that consumers have experienced. Consumers anticipating this will not
try the products in the first place and the separation between low and high
quality products will collapse.
Repeat purchases will also play an important role in the presence of
moral hazard, such that firms have an incentive to pretend selling a high
quality product but to deteriorate quality (after the purchase has been
agreed). Firms might resist the temptation of selling a low quality item if
this induces the consumers to make additional purchases (on which some
margin will be earned). Similarly, if consumers entertain the possibility
that the firm is somehow ‘‘honest’’ and would sell a high quality product
in all instances, it might want to confirm these beliefs and establish the
reputation of being an ‘‘honest’’ seller. In both instances, repeat purchases
and the ability to recognize in later purchases the products that have been
bought initially are essential. Trademark protection will also be necessary
because competitors might have an incentive to take advantage of the
reputation established by others firms (for instance, competitors with a
higher discount rate).
To sum up, trademark protection seems important to ensure that
repeat purchases help alleviate problems of moral hazard and adverse
selection. The operation of mechanisms based on repeat purchases will
also tend to increase welfare and bring benefits to consumers.
There are some striking differences between the role of trademarks and
that of patents. Patents provide a stream of revenues to innovators and
this, in turn, provides incentive to incur the fixed cost associated with
4 Economides (1984) develops an argument along similar lines. He makes a distinction
between frequently and infrequently purchased goods, suggesting that if trademarks are
particularly useful for the former, they may also be useful in the latter case, in particular
when a company sells both frequently and infrequently purchased goods (so the
reputation spills over products).
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development of innovations. A key feature of intellectual property is
precisely the fact that the cost of dissemination is typically negligible.5
In those circumstances, unrestricted use of the intellectual property by
other firms would also lead to a net benefit ex post (the loss of profit for
the innovator would be more than compensated by the increase in profit
for the imitator and the increase in consumer surplus). Intellectual con-
tent thus has the feature of a public good and in a second best world where
patents are the only instrument, the design of patents will balance the
benefits that accrue from marginal innovations with the deadweight loss
on infra-marginal ones.
In the case of trademarks, the matter would appear to be somewhat
different. In the context of the models discussed above, the firm which
establishes a trademark incurs a cost (it foregoes profit in the short term)
in the hope of reaping profits in the long term. However, unlike what
happens with innovations, unrestricted use of trademarks would actually
lead to a net cost ex post; the imitator would appropriate some of the
surplus that would accrue (ex post) to the firm which induces repeat
purchases and consumer surplus would fall (repeat purchases would no
longer take place). The improved communication which is sanctioned by
trademark protection does not seem to have the feature of a public good.
Unlike patents, whose extension imposes a deadweight loss, trademark
protection would thus appear to confer benefits such that they should be
unrestricted, at least in the framework that we have considered so far.
Special features of trademark laws and in particular the dependency of
the entitlement to a trademark on use, not simply invention, are also best
understood in terms of this framework. Only if a trademark is in use is
there a danger that consumers will be misled by someone other than the
original holder attaching it to their products or services. In addition,
traditionally, it has been a requirement in establishing a trademark viola-
tion, to show the possibility of consumers being misled.
The case for trademark protection should however not be generalized
beyond the confines of the particular models that we have referred to.
Indeed, there are clearly some circumstances where it may be attractive to
restrict trademark protection. Consider for instance a small variation of
the models above in which entry by a more efficient producer is feasible at
a later stage. This producer may have the same incentive as the original
5 That is also to say that there is no rivalry in the consumption of intellectual content
(a good whose production only requires to incur a fixed cost is effectively a public good).
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producer with respect to the provision of high quality goods and repeated
purchases. Trademark protection will however bar entry and might
impose a net cost.
More generally, it would appear that trademarks can play an additional
economic role, beyond that of securing repeated purchases and allow-
ing for the operation of mechanisms which solve moral hazard and
adverse selection. Consider for instance an environment where there is
no asymmetric information regarding the characteristics of the products
but in which a consumer’s willingness to pay for the product can be
increased through advertising.6 The natural reference here is a model
with endogenous sunk cost a` la Sutton and the Rolex watch may provide
a suitable illustration; the mechanical features of such watch can arguably
be observed by consumers and can be imitated by other producers.
Assume that advertising conveys no information about the product and
has solely the effect of raising consumers’ willingness to pay for the watch
(because it conveys a signal of a particular life style). The welfare con-
sequences of trademark protection in this case are not as clear-cut as those
discussed above. In particular, the effect on consumer surplus of allowing
for imitation ex post is less clear, as consumers who enjoy the mechanical
features of a Rolex watch but do not value the signal would benefit at the
expense of those who consider it as highly valuable.7 In other words, the
rationale for protecting the effect of advertising does not seem as compel-
ling as protecting the operation of repeat purchases.
There are also some circumstances where trademark protection will be
clearly unattractive. For instance, trademark protection could possibly be
used in order to raise entry barriers and protect rents. This will arise if the
trademark covers some generic product – for which asymmetric informa-
tion is unimportant (imagine that the expression ‘‘pain killer’’ is given
trademark protection). This could be the result of trademark protection
being captured by producers’ interests. The legal doctrines in some
jurisdictions that allow the curtailment of trademark protection once
the mark is deemed to take on a ‘‘generic’’ meaning may actually reflect
the concern of not protecting producer rents.
6 Economides (1984) discusses this as an instance where a ‘‘mental image’’ is associated
with the product, so that the product acquires a new characteristic.
7 Economides (1984) refers to this as a form of allocative inefficiency which arises from the
fact that particular characteristics (the mental image and the mechanical features) are tied
in fixed proportions.
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Finally, it is worth noticing that in some circumstances, trademarks
might have a public good aspect. This arises because, as symbols or
communicative signs, trademarks become important features of the
‘‘Lebenswelt’’, as it were – they represent a significant part of the language
of human social and even political communication. Protecting the trade-
marks could then lead to suppression of freedom of expression, and
welfare reducing declines in human creativity. Consider Warhol’s
Campbell’s Soup can, and the use and distortion of marks as a form of
political parody or satire by anti-globalization activists (see Rosemary
Coombe (1998); Beebe (2003)).
To sum up, if there is a presumption in favor of trademark protection
when it contributes to mechanisms which solve problems of moral hazard
and adverse selection, there are also some circumstances where trademark
protection is less attractive.
The trade-off between the benefits from additional trademarks and the
cost of trademark protection on infra-marginal ones is also such that
extensive trademark protection is probably desirable. The terms of the
trade-off are different from what is normally found for innovations, given
that the cost of trademark protection on infra-marginal products is likely
to be much less than the cost of patent protection on infra-marginal
innovations. Trademark protection may be costly only when trademarks
have a public good aspect as a means of fostering communication.
3.2 International trademark rules
How do these welfare trade-offs play out when we move from the
domestic context to the international one: what do they imply about
the justification or lack thereof for global trademark protection?
The external effects that patent protection induces across jurisdiction
will be discussed later. In this section, we will emphasize that in defining
patent protection in the domestic market for domestic (or foreign) firms,
a domestic government will not consider the benefit that accrues to
foreign consumers from additional innovations. In addition, in defining
its policy towards foreign firms, a domestic government will not consider
the benefit that accrues to foreign firms.
When it comes to trademarks, the matter is a little different because the
external effect to foreign consumers may not be important. If we confine
ourselves to the most favorable case for trademarks (as protecting
repeated purchases), a trademark policy towards firms operating in the
domestic market will mostly affect the range of products sold to domestic
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customers and not that sold to foreign customers. Indeed, one expects, as
a first approximation, that the range of product sold in the foreignmarket
will be determined by the protection that can be obtained abroad (of
course, to the extent that foreign consumers may be exposed to domestic
trademarks through distance media like the internet, there will still be a
spillover effect across countries). As in the case of patents however, a
domestic government will not consider the profit accruing to foreign
firms in deciding whether to grant trademark protection in the domestic
market. Still, the benefit to domestic consumers may be enough to justify
a decision to grant trademark protection to the foreign firms (independ-
ently of the rents accruing to the firms).8
Overall, external effects across jurisdictions in the case of trademarks
are less of a concern than in the case of patents. They only arise to the
extent that foreign profits are not taken into account andmay thus lead to
insufficient protection to foreign firms.
The issue still arises whether in those circumstances, the foreign gov-
ernment might be able to invoke the interest of domestic consumers in
order to obtain trademark protection. There is nothing as such illegit-
imate in a country making a claim to care for the welfare of consumers in
another country (international human rights and labor law are illustra-
tions of the principle that human concern does not stop at national
boundaries).
Still, the external effect that we have identified would be best addressed
by an international trademark law concerned with fair treatment of
foreigners, in other words, with preventing abusive or discriminatory
application of trademark law to aliens. Thus, it could be considered to
be a lex specialis of general international law on the protection of aliens. In
this environment, one would expect to see little substantive harmoniza-
tion of domestic trademark laws, but rather the exclusion of certain kinds
of grounds or pretexts for disposing of trademark applications by aliens,
grounds or pretexts that sound in arbitrariness or discrimination. While
formally appearing as a kind of at least ‘‘negative’’ harmonization, this
kind of international trademark lawmight better be understood as a set of
specialized rules for the protection of aliens.
Our discussion of external effects has so far focused on circumstances
where trademark protection is most likely to be attractive in terms of
8 For instance, if trademark protection is a discrete instrument. With a continuous
instrument, the degree of protection to foreign firms will be less.
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welfare. If trademarks are used in order to raise entry barriers, or protect
advertising aimed at raising consumers’ willingness to pay, the external
effects will be different and may be closer to those normally associated
with non-tariff barriers which shifts rents between domestic and foreign
producers.
Finally, note that besides the internalization of external effects, inter-
national trademark law could be fundamentally concerned simply with
reducing those enforcement costs of trademark law that arise from trans-
boundary economic activity. In such cases, each jurisdiction would pre-
serve its sovereignty to make such choices for its own consumers.
3.3 Positive international law of trademark protection
With these conceptual considerations in mind, we now turn to the
positive international law of trademark protection. The locus classicus
for such law is the Paris Convention.
The trademark provisions of the Paris Convention are not preceded or
prefaced by any preamble or statement of objectives (nor does the Paris
Convention itself have Preamble). Instead, the trademark provisions
in the Convention begin with the assertion of a default rule in favor of
domestic sovereignty: ‘‘The conditions for the filing and registration of
trademarks shall be determined in each country of the Union by its
domestic legislation.’’ (6.1). Article 6 then goes on to state some specific
limitations on this default rule, listing a limited number of grounds on
which it is impermissible to refuse to register and protect a trademark
held by an alien. These impermissible grounds include: that the mark was
not registered originally in the alien’s own country (6.2); that the mark
differs from the mark registered in the country of origin ‘‘only in respect
of elements that do not alter its distinctive character and do not affect its
identity in the form in which it has been registered in the said country of
origin’’; grounds that relate to ‘‘the nature of the goods’’(7).
In addition, there is a general obligation to ‘‘refuse and to cancel the
registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which constitutes a
reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of
a mark considered by the competent authority of the country of registra-
tion or use to be well known in that country as being already the mark of a
person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or
similar goods.’’(6bis(1)).
Considered individually and in relation to each other, these various
obligations suggest a quite limited degree of positive harmonization of
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domestic trademark law. There is a default rule in favor of domestic
sovereignty, and the only general substantive norm, reflected in 6(bis)(1)
is that of avoidance of consumer confusion.
The limited harmonization implied by these obligations is in line with
the absence of strong external effects discussed above. The emphasis on
consumer confusion is also consistent with the main motivation for
trademark protection discussed above. From that perspective, it should
be noted that the language ‘‘liable to create confusion’’ would probably
exclude from the obligation in 6(bis)(1) uses of trademarks in general
social and political communication (parody etc.), since such uses do not
confuse consumers searching for goods, almost by definition. Nor would
it require the protection of ‘‘generic’’ names, since in such instances most
consumers may be simply expecting that the similar or identical product
has certain generic characteristics, rather than a particular quality asso-
ciated with it being manufactured by the original user of the mark.
Apart from 6(bis)(1), which introduces an element of positive
harmonization, the other trademark rules in the Paris Convention, do
not really go beyond the objectives of fair and non-discriminatory
treatment that characterize a lex specialis on protection of aliens. They
seem to aim at insuring aliens’ demands for recognition and registration
of their marks are not denied or frustrated on grounds that could invite
arbitrary or discriminatory behavior by governmental authorities in
other states.
Apart from the Paris Convention there are a range of other international
legal instruments that relate to trademark protection, such as the
Trademark Law Treaty (1994) and the Madrid Agreement Concerning
the International Regulation of Marks. These Agreements seem aimed
primarily at the reduction of transboundary enforcement costs of trade-
mark law. They deal with many technical aspects of registration of marks
outside the jurisdiction, and related matters. To some extent, by specify-
ing procedures to be used by national authorities in dealing with aliens,
these Agreements could also, in certain aspects, be considered lex specialis
of the law of protection of aliens.
This brings us to the trademark provisions of the WTO TRIPs
Agreement, the relevant provisions in the Havana Club dispute.
The Preamble to TRIPs recognizes ‘‘underlying public policy object-
ives’’ for the protection of intellectual property in domestic legal
systems. It does not single out any particular purpose or objective as far
as trademark law is concerned. Article 7 of TRIPs acknowledges that
complex welfare trade-offs may be implicated in the way and extent to
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which intellectual property is protected, and states the principle that ‘‘The
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should con-
tribute to the promotion of technological innovation and the transfer of
technology . . . in amanner conducive to social and economic welfare, and
to a balance of rights and obligations.’’ Article 8.1 states that Members
have a general police power to adopt health and nutrition measures and
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development subject only to any specific
constraints contained in the textual provisions of TRIPs. Taken together,
these various provisions suggest that interpretations of TRIPs should not
be based upon a presumption of the intent to harmonize intellectual
property laws, especially beyond the extent to which it would be clearly
‘‘conducive to social and economic welfare,’’ but instead a presumption
that TRIPs preserves domestic regulatory autonomy and diversity subject
to certain precisely specified textual constraints.
The provisions of TRIPs that apply to trademarks largely follow the
Paris Convention, discussed above; and the general TRIPs obligations of
National Treatment andMFN also apply to trademarks. AWTOMember
may deny registration to a trademark on any ground that does not
‘‘derogate from the provisions of the Paris Convention’’ or is explicitly
prohibited by TRIPs provisions themselves.
The only clear instance of substantive harmonization of trademark
law to be found in TRIPs is the requirement that anyone other than
the original holder be excluded from using the mark, where there the
consumer is liable to be confused (16(1)). However, TRIPs is slightly
more harmonizing than the Paris Convention, by virtue of establishing
a presumption of confusion in the case of identical goods and services.
Also TRIPs 16(1) does not require that the mark be well known in order
to benefit from this general norm of protection. On the other hand,
unlike Paris Convention 6bis, which refers to ‘‘interested party’’, only
the ‘‘owner’’ of a trademark may assert exclusive use, under 16(1) of
TRIPs (an aspect of that provision which as we shall see will be quite
crucial to the AB’s disposition of the appeal). Finally, 16.1, and all
the other provisions of TRIPs on trademarks, are however subject to
a general exceptions provision, which states: ‘‘Members may pro-
vide limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a trademark, such as
fair use of descriptive terms, provided that such exception take account
of the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of
third parties’’ (Article 17). TRIPs explicitly acknowledges that a WTO
Member may make trademark protection contingent on use, and that
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trademark protection may be cancelled due to non-use, subject to
certain conditions. The TRIPs obligations on enforcement of intellectual
property rights apply mutatis mutandis to trademarks. The provisions
can be understood as a lex specialis of the law of protection of aliens,
as well as going to the reduction of enforcement costs across national
boundaries.
In sum, none of the provisions of TRIPs related to trademarks evidence
any intent to substantially harmonize trademark law beyond the minimal
extent evidenced in the Paris Convention. The minimum harmonization
which is contemplated by the international law of patent protection is also
broadly consistent with the economic analysis discussed above which has
emphasized that external effects across jurisdictionsmay not be as import-
ant for trademark protection as for other instruments. The emphasis
given by international law to the protection of aliens is also appropriate
given that the main external effects in patent protection which would not
otherwise be internalized arise with respect to the profits accruing to
foreign producers.
4 The AB ruling
Article 6 quinquies of the Paris Convention
The EC appealed the panel’s finding that the United States legislation did
not violate Article 6quinquies of the Paris Convention, incorporated into
the TRIPs agreement through TRIPs 2.1. This provision reads, in part:
‘‘Every trademark duly registered in the country of origin shall be
accepted for filing and protected as is in the other countries of the
union, subject to the reservations indicated in this article . . .’’(emphasis
added).
These reservations include situations where the trademark may ‘‘be of
such a nature as to infringe rights acquired by third parties in the country
where protection is claimed’’; where the mark ‘‘is devoid of distinctive
character’’ or has become essentially generic; and where the mark is
‘‘contrary to morality or public order, and in particular, of such a nature
as to deceive the public.’’
Placing considerable emphasis on the expression ‘‘as is’’ in the first
paragraph of Article 6quinquies, the panel found that Article 6quinquies
did not create a self-standing obligation to register a trademark, subject to
a limited number of reservations or exceptions, but rather only required
that, if domestic law otherwise permitted registration of the mark, it must
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be registered ‘‘as is’’, i.e. in exactly the form presented to the authority
upon registration. Thus, Article 6quinquies did not derogate from a
Member’s general right under Paris Convention 6.1 to determine the
conditions for the filing and registration of trademarks by its domestic
legislation’’, except as regards the form of the mark. In consequence, the
challenged US legislation did not violate Article 6quinquies, in as much as
the restrictions it placed on registration were not related to the form of the
mark.
The grammar of 6quinquies is logically consistent with either the
broader meaning asserted by the EC (‘‘You must register this trademark,
and not only that, you have to register it as is unless one of the exceptions
applies’’) and the narrower meaning discerned by the panel (‘‘if your
domestic law otherwise permits the registration of this trademark, you
are obliged to register it in exactly the form that it is presented, subject to
the exceptions).
Thus, the Appellate Body rightly found that the ‘‘ordinary meaning’’ of
the words in 6quinquies was not sufficient to resolve the issue, and went
on to explore the ‘‘context’’ of 6quinquies. The Appellate Body then
determined that the ‘‘context’’ supported the narrower interpretation
made by the panel.
The first contextual consideration that the Appellate Body adduced was
Paris Convention Article 6.1, the general default rule of domestic sover-
eignty: the AB suggested that ‘‘if Article 6quinquies A(1) were interpreted
too broadly, the legislative discretion reserved for Members under Article
6(1) would be significantly undermined.’’ This is an important interpret-
ive move by the Appellate Body. In effect, the AB uses 6.1 as evidence
of the limited or modest aspiration of the Paris Convention with respect
to the substantive harmonization of trademark laws. Some might criticize
the AB here, since 6.1 explicitly limits the default rule of domestic
sovereignty, by stating it is subject to the obligations in the Paris
Convention itself, and therefore, 6.1 merely begs the question of how
narrow or broad those obligations might be, i.e. how much they cut into
the default rule of domestic sovereignty. Yet such an alternative reading
of 6.1 would reduce the provision to a triviality: ‘‘you are permitted to
do what is not prohibited to you.’’ That would simply restate what is
already obvious, at least since the Lotus case, namely that the sovereignty
of states is presumed to be unlimited, unless bounded by specific rules of
law.
Thus, to give 6.1 an effective meaning, it must be interpreted as
signaling that, in fact, such derogations from domestic sovereignty as
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are provided for in the Paris Convention, will be narrow, bounded, and
clearly expressed.
It is to be noted that there are provisions in other WTO Agreements
with a rather analogous structure to that of Paris Convention 6.1. For
example, the Preamble of the TBT Agreement states that ‘‘no country
should be prevented from taking measures necessary to ensure the quality
of its exports, or for the protection of human, animal or plant life or
health or for the prevention of deceptive practices, at the levels it considers
appropriate, subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail or
a disguised restriction on international trade, and are otherwise in accord-
ance with the provisions of this Agreement.’’(emphasis added). A reading
of this provision analogous to that which the AB makes of Paris
Convention 6.1 would have the result that the treaty interpreter should
be very reluctant to read the provisions of TBT in such a way as to limit a
Member’s right to choose the appropriate level of regulatory protection
or intervention, unless the text cannot be read any other way. This would
defeat expansive readings of certain provisions of TBT, which suggest a
proportionality test, for example, even though such a test is not explicitly
specified in the language in question (see Howse and Tuerk, 2001 on TBT
Article 2.2, footnote 91, p. 317, criticizing the expansive interpretation of
the late Bob Hudec).
Similarly, according to SPS 2.1, ‘‘Members have the right to take
sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of
human, animal or plant life or health, provided that such measures are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.’’ By stipulating
domestic regulatory autonomy as a general right, SPS 2.1 implies that
any limit to that right must be clearly established by the textual provisions
of SPS, and that the treaty interpreter must avoid interpretations of SPS
provisions that would result in largely uncircumscribed or unbounded
interferences with the general right.
To return toHavana Club, the AB went on to illustrate the wisdom of a
narrower reading of 6quinquies by reference to the jurisdiction-shopping
effects if the broader EC reading were adopted. As the AB noted, there are
twomeans by which a holder of a trademark from aMember of theWTO/
Paris Union can seek trademark protection in the territory of another
Member. Pursuant to Article 6 of the Paris Convention, it can seek
directly to register the mark with the authorities of that other Member,
in which case such registration is, on account of 6.1, subject to such
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conditions as exist in the domestic law of that other Member.9
Alternately, the AB noted, a trademark holder of a Member could first
register the mark with that Member’s authorities, and then seek registra-
tion from the authorities of the other Member, pursuant to Article
6quinquies. If the EC interpretation were correct, the AB conjectured,
then a mark holder could do an end run around the domestic legal
requirements of the other Member, by going the route of Article 6quin-
quies, which, on the EC reading, requires registration and protection of
the mark, subject to the limited exceptions in that Article itself. The AB
suggested that thus ‘‘a national of a Paris Union country could circumvent
the ‘‘use’’ requirements of a particular regime by registering in the jur-
isdiction that does not impose ‘‘use’’ requirements.
The problemwith the AB reasoning here is that Article 6quinquies itself
states that ‘‘In determining whether amark is eligible for protection, all the
factual circumstances must be taken into consideration, particularly the
length of time the mark has been in use.’’(C.1) (emphasis added). This
clearly implies that whatever else Article 6quinquies means, it does allow
for the possibility that a Member could make a decision that a trademark
is not eligible because of lack of use. Thus, the AB is wrong that, on the EC
reading of Article 6quinquies, the mark holder of a Member could avoid
the use requirement of another Member, through resorting to Article
6quinquies. Moreover, whatever reading is adopted of Article 6quinquies,
this Article, as incorporated into TRIPs, is subject to the explicit acknow-
ledgement in Article 19 of TRIPs that use may be required to maintain a
registration, subject to the conditions stated in that Article.
We emphasize however that the error of interpretation in this particu-
lar step in the AB’s reasoning does not really mar the compelling logic
of its general view that interpreting 6quinquies in the way proposed by the
EC would introduce a requirement of minimum positive harmonization,
or mutual recognition, not warranted by the context of 6quinquies and
the overall structure of the TRIPs trademark regime. Once having inter-
preted 6quinquies in context, the AB felt it necessary to address one
particular argument of the EC in favor of its alternative, broader reading,
namely that the exceptions listed in 6quinquies would only make sense
if its application were broader than to just the form of the mark. The
9 It should be added, a Member could also, quite apart from registration, simply demand
the substantive minimum of protection afforded by the Convention Article 6bis/TRIPs
Article 16/1, namely exclusion of other users where the consumer is likely to be confused,
provided it could otherwise establish in some way that it is ‘‘owner’’ of the mark.
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AB, in reply, simply asserted: ‘‘The form of a trademark may be devoid
of distinctive character within the meaning of paragraph 2 . . . Equally
the form of a trademark may be contrary to morality or public order,
or of such a nature as to deceive the public within the meaning of
paragraph 3.’’
Finally, the AB introduced an additional contextual consideration,
namely an agreed interpretation of Article 6quinquies as it appeared
in the original Paris Convention of 1883, which made clear that the
provision in question only prohibits exclusion from registration based
on the form of the mark, leaving Members free to deny registration, based
on other conditions or criteria in their domestic laws. However, this
agreed interpretation was omitted in subsequent versions of the Paris
Convention.
The AB was clearly unsure about relying on the agreed interpretation in
these circumstances, so it states ‘‘. . . [W]e simply observe that our inter-
pretation . . . is not inconsistent with this interpretation.’’ Was it correct,
under the Vienna Convention rules, to avert to the 1883 agreed inter-
pretation as part of the ‘‘context’’ of the Paris Convention as incorporated
into TRIPs? We believe so. According to VCLT 31(2)(a), ‘‘context’’
includes ‘‘any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between
all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty.’’ VCLT
31(2)(a) applies not only to agreements that are explicitly made an
integral part of the main treaty, but to any agreement connected with
the conclusion of the treaty. The fact that the instrument incorporating
the agreed interpretation was not made an integral part of subsequent
versions of the treaty, does not as such defeat its status as an ‘‘agree-
ment . . .made in connection with the conclusion of the treaty.’’ And, as
the AB notes, there was no attempt at any time to explicitly revoke or
repudiate the agreed interpretation, or to alter it. In our view, the VCLT
would have allowed the AB to rely to a greater extent than it did on the
agreed interpretation, which it appeared to treat almost as supplementary
means, like travaux, which could normally only be used to confirm an
interpretation based on primary sources.
There is a way in which the AB could have acted with greater judicial
economy in its consideration of the meaning of Article 6quinquies. It
could have held that even if, arguendo, the expansive interpretation by
the EC of the Article were correct, the US legislation would nevertheless
have fallen within the ‘‘third party rights’’ exception, which allows a
Member to exclude registration and protection where the trademark is of
such a nature as to infringe rights acquired by third parties in the country
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where protection is claimed.10 Under the US legislation at issue, clearly,
rights have been acquired by the original owners of confiscated assets,
and their heirs and assigns. It is in the name of these third party rights that
the US was excluding registration under the challenged legislative provi-
sions. This is reinforced by the fact that should the third partieswaive their
rights the legislation would permit registration and protection to proceed.
Why then did the AB decide to venture an interpretation of a complex
legal provision that it wasn’t required to make, and indeed one based in
part on what seems to be an incomplete and erroneous reading of aspects
of the Paris Convention? The AB seems to have thought it important to
shut the door to the use of TRIPs to expand the scope of legally mandated
intellectual property protection, beyond that strictly and clearly man-
dated by the treaty language. Here one cannot wonder if there was a
broader policy context at least in part influencing (if sub-consciously) the
judges: the context of debates over globalization and intellectual property,
where many aspects of TRIPs have been criticized as the product of
industry capture, extending IP protections at the global level beyond
what could be justified on the basis of either domestic welfare in all
WTO Member states, or global economic welfare).
Importantly, the defeat of the EC’s broad reading of Article 6quinquies
also helps to close the door to the use of TRIPs to grant trademark
protection in other circumstances than those where they reduce con-
sumer search cost.
To see this, it is important to compare carefully Paris Convention 6bis
and 6quinquies as interpreted by the EC. 6bis, as already discussed, does
create a substantive right for an ‘‘interested party’’ to insist that the
authorities of a Member country prohibit on their territory the use of a
mark well known in the country of origin, where that use is liable to
confuse consumers. Moreover, it is this substantive right to a certain level
of trademark protection in other Member countries that is, in a slightly
modified form, restated in Article 16(1) of TRIPs. If, as the EC proposed,
6quinquies were to be read as creating a right to registration and protec-
tion, subject to a set of exhaustively listed exceptions, a new substantive
right would be created that would rival and exceed that in Paris 6bis/
TRIPS 16(1). Since 6quinquies does not limit themeaning of ‘‘protection’’
to the enforcement of exclusive use where other use might confuse
10 This would be somewhat analogous to the way that the AB avoided deciding the
question of territorial nexus under Article XX(g) in Shrimp/Turtle I.
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consumers, and indeed does not define ‘‘protection’’ at all, the EC inter-
pretation would allow the door to open at theWTO on expansive views of
trademark protection now being advanced by corporate interests in the
courts of various domestic jurisdictions, with varying degrees of success,
e.g. anti-dilution. These expansive views are widely questioned in the
economics literature as discussed above. The TRIPs Agreement itself
mandates readings of that Agreement that would make intellectual prop-
erty protection ‘‘conducive to social and economic welfare.’’ On the basis
of economic analysis, an expansion of trademark protection beyond what
is required to support the consumer search cost reduction function might
well not be ‘‘conducive to social and economic welfare.’’
TRIPs 15.1 and 15.2
TRIPs 15.1 states certain grounds on which a mark may not be denied
eligibility for trademark protection. Namely, WTO Members may not
exclude from eligibility for trademark protection a sign because of the
kind of sign that it is – thus whether the sign is constituted of words,
letters, numerals, figurative elements, combinations of colors, or a mix of
any of the above, it shall nevertheless be eligible for registration. There
thus seems to be some overlap between TRIPs 15.1 and Paris Convention
6quinquies, which requires that a trademark be registered as is.
TRIPs 15.2 provides that 15.1 ‘‘shall not be understood to prevent a
Member from denying registration of a trademark on other grounds,
provided that they do not derogate from the provisions of the Paris
Convention (1967).’’
Much in the manner in which it sought to discern in Paris Convention
6quinquies a substantive right to trademark protection, the EC argued that
15.1 provided not merely for negative harmonization (stating certain dis-
crete grounds on which Members were not permitted to distinguish
between trademarks as eligible or not eligible for protection), but rather
stated a right to have a trademark protected, unless the decision not to pro-
tect was well within one of the exceptions permitted by the Paris Convention.
Unlike the case with Paris Convention 6quinquies, the ordinary mean-
ing of the words in 15.1 excluded the interpretation being urged by the
EC. As the Appellate Body noted (paragraph 155), Article 15.1 deals with
the question of when a mark may be ‘‘eligible’’ for or ‘‘capable of ’’
receiving trademark protection. The EC’s reading would in effect elim-
inate those words from the treaty text, such that 15.1 would say not when
a mark must be eligible for protection, but rather when there is an
obligation to provide the protection.
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However, the AB went further, and sought support for its (obvious)
reading of 15.1 from the ‘‘context’’ of 15.2, which states that Members can
nevertheless deny registration of a trademark on ‘‘other grounds’’, pro-
vided that they do not derogate from the Paris Convention. As the AB
pointed out, the reference to ‘‘other grounds’’ suggests that all 15.1 does is
to state one particular kind of grounds on which Members cannot refuse
to consider a trademark eligible for registration and protection, namely
what kind of signs or symbols it consists of. The AB further cited as
‘‘context’’ for its interpretation, TRIPs 15.4, which establishes that a
trademark may not be denied registration simply because of the nature
of goods or services that it designates. As the AB noted, if, as the EC
suggested, 15.1 constituted a general obligation to register and protect
trademarks, rather than stating a single prohibited ground for denying
registration and protection, then 15.4 would be superfluous; there would
be no need to state prohibited grounds one by one, since by virtue of 15.1
there is instead (on the EC theory) a general obligation to register and
protect, subject to certain defined exceptions.
Even though this disposed of the EC’s appeal on this issue, since no
violation could be found (the US legislation in question having nothing to
do with the kind of sign that composes the mark), the AB made a point of
going on to consider and reject the EC’s interpretation of 15.2. The EC’s
view of 15.2 was that it limited the legal right to refuse registration and
protection to those situations explicated stated as exceptions in the Paris
Convention (or TRIPs itself ). The AB, however, regarded 15.2 as an
affirmation of the default rule of domestic sovereignty in Paris
Convention 6.1. In other words, Members are free to determine the
conditions of trademark registration and protection, subject to certain
explicit prohibited grounds, which they are forbidden to use to discrim-
inate between trademarks with respect to eligibility for registration and
protection.
Here, the AB made an explicit decision to jettison judicial economy, it
would seem, in order to make clear as guidance for future panels the
overall nature of TRIPs as far as trademarks are concerned; TRIPs is not
an agreement for substantive harmonization, or mutual recognition, but
merely reinforces or reaffirms the negative integration commitments of
the Paris Convention.
TRIPs Article 16.1
If there is some element of positive harmonization or integration in the
TRIPs trademark provisions, it would have to be found in Article 16.1,
united states  section 211 199
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745605001291
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:38:22, subject to the Cambridge Core
which as noted in an earlier section of this chapter, is similar to Paris
Convention 6bis, in conferring a substantive right to exclude third parties
from using the mark for identical or similar goods or services such that
there is a likelihood of consumer confusion. Unlike Paris Convention
6bis, TRIPs 16.1 requires a presumption of likelihood of confusion where
the sign being used is identical to the original mark.
There is, however, a crucial difference between Article 16.1 and Paris
Convention 6bis. Paris Convention 6bis does not depend on the concept
of ownership. Instead, it states that the mark ‘‘must be considered by the
competent authority of the country of registration or use to be well
known in that country as being already the mark of a person entitled to
the benefits of the Convention . . .’’ Thus, who can exclude others from
using a mark appears to depend on the decision of the authorities of the
jurisdiction of initial registration and/or use.
By contrast, neither TRIPs 16.1, nor any other provision of TRIPs for
that matter, defines how, or by whom, the question of ownership is to be
determined. In the absence of any explicit provisions on these matters in
either TRIPs or the Paris Convention, the panel had asked the Director
General of the International Bureau of WIPO for an expert opinion on
whether the Paris Convention contained an implicit definition of ‘‘own-
ership.’’ The Director General answered in the negative.
The Appellate Body approved the panel’s deference to this opinion
from WIPO. This is an example of the kind of ‘‘institutional sensitivity’’
that Howse and Nicolaidis recommend in dispute settlement (Howse and
Nicolaidis, 2003: Howse, 2000). The legitimacy of the dispute settlement
organs is enhanced when they are prepared to defer to the judgment of
non-WTO international institutions with expert competence in a special-
ized legal regime that intersects with the rules of the WTO. What is
striking here, though, is the AB’s endorsement of such deference not
just with respect to factual matters, but also in legal interpretation; this
qualifies what seemed in some earlier cases the AB’s tendency to consider
itself competent to interpret the relevant law of other regimes, including
municipal law, as if it were interpreting WTO law itself (provided of
course that the other law was properly before it as relevant to the applica-
tion of a WTO Agreement; India – Patents, EC – Bananas).
On the other hand, the absence of an implicit definition of ownership
in the Paris Convention, as determined by the official experts of that legal
regime, does not excuse the Appellate Body from attempting a contextual
definition of ownership as it relates, not to the obligations of the Paris
Convention, but to those in TRIPs itself. The EC pointed to a number of
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provisions of TRIPs that, contextually, seemed to suggest that the owner
of a trademark, at least presumptively, was the undertaking that had
originally used or registered the mark, and anyone who had legally
acquired the mark from that original ‘‘owner’’.
The very nature of 16.1 is that of an obligation that rights established in
one jurisdiction (the home jurisdiction) be recognized by the authorities
of other WTO jurisdictions; thus, there is arguably no need to define
ownership. Ownership and other pre-conditions for the establishment of
a trademark are naturally governed, in the logic of a recognition provision,
by the laws of the home country, absent any explicit minimum inter-
national standards. Viewed in this way, the conclusion that the Appellate
Body draws from the silence on ownership in TRIPs is perverse – namely,
that the jurisdiction obliged to recognize a trademark right duly estab-
lished in the home country gets to decide who is a bona fide owner of the
right.
A recognition and enforcement regime such as that in 16.1 is of course
appropriately subject to exceptions of a public policy nature; and in a case
such as Havana Club the United States could arguably invoke such an
exception, if the decision of the host country to recognize a certain
individual or entity as an owner violated the public policy of the United
States. But that is quite another matter than inferring a general default
rule that the country of recognition and enforcement, not the country
where the rights are established in the first place, has full latitude to
determine who is a trademark ‘‘owner.’’
As was discussed earlier in this chapter, economic analysis questions
whether positive harmonization of the substantive norms of trademark
law can be justified on welfare grounds. The strongest economic case for
positive harmonization is that global consumer welfare is likely to be
enhanced if every country was required to take steps to avoid use of
marks so as to confuse consumers. In interpreting TRIPs 16.1 the way it
does, the AB seems to shrink from accepting even that degree of positive
harmonization that would, broadly speaking, be supportable on the basis
of economic analysis. But there are important reasons of democracy,
reasons that relate to the legitimacy of WTO law and adjudication, for
taking as seriously as the AB does a declared default rule of domestic
sovereignty.
At the same time, by virtue of TRIPs Article 2.1, Article 6bis of the Paris
Convention is incorporated into TRIPs. While substantially overlapping
with TRIPs 16.1, there is nothing in 16.1 that explicitly states that it alters
and surpasses Paris Convention 6bis. Since Paris Convention 6bis confers,
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not on the ‘‘owner’’ of the mark but rather on an ‘‘interested party’’ the
right to demand that the authorities of a Member enforce exclusive use
where the mark is ‘‘considered by the competent authority of the country
of registration or use to be well known in that country as being already the
mark of a person entitled to the benefits of the Convention . . .’’, the AB
could have gone on to complete the analysis, as it were, applying to the
facts Paris Convention 6bis, which contains a substantive right closely
analogous to that in 16.1. Paris Convention 6bis appears to resolve the
kind of situation where ownership of the mark is contested across differ-
ent jurisdictions (here the US vs. Cuba) by deferring to the views of the
authorities in the country of registration and use, assuming that that is a
country where the authorities consider it to be well known that the mark
is already the mark ‘‘of a person entitled to the benefits of the
Convention . . . ’’ (the panel below had rejected the EC claim that the US
legislation violated Paris Convention 6bis, on rather unclear grounds, that
seem related to a concession of the EC to the US position that 6bis in no
way precluded each country’s authorities frommaking their own decision
about how confiscation might affect the determination of whether a mark
was a ‘‘mark of a person entitled to the benefits of the Convention’’).
In any case, the AB’s holding that domestic sovereignty to restrict the
ownership of trademarks remains essentially unconstrained by TRIPs is of
no small importance. On the AB’s logic, through ownership measures, a
government can impose a wide range of responsibilities on an entity that
wishes to have the status of ‘‘owner’’ of a mark, including social respon-
sibilities. If the US view of the Cuban revolution and the Castro regime is a
legitimate basis to make a determination of who owns a trade mark, then
denying a mark, for example, to an entity that manufactures marked
goods in sweatshops that violate internationally recognized labor stand-
ardsmight equally be legitimate, if not more so. (See Katherine VanWezel
Stone, 1999).
Moreover, one may ask if the analysis of ‘‘ownership’’ by the AB in
Havana Clubmight not have implications for the interpretation of TRIPs
obligations in respect of other forms of intellectual property. Take the case
of patents. Article 28.1 of TRIPs requires that certain exclusive rights on
the ‘‘owner’’ of a patent. Article 27 of TRIPs lists specific grounds on which
Members may or may not exclude patentability. But TRIPs says nothing
about the determination of who is the ‘‘owner’’ of a patent and is therefore
entitled to the exclusive rights named in TRIPs 28.1. Of course, the
National Treatment and MFN obligations in TRIPs would apply to
determinations of ownership under domestic law.
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As for the Berne Convention, as incorporated into TRIPs, it appears to
have a similar default rule in favor of domestic sovereignty over the
conditions of substantive protection of intellectual property as does the
Paris Convention in respect of trademarks. Thus Article 27.5 of the Berne
Convention provides: ‘‘. . . any Contracting State is free to apply, when
determining the patentability of an invention claimed in an international
application, the criteria of its national law in respect of prior art and other
conditions of patentability not constituting requirements as to the form
and contents of applications.’’
If thus WTOMembers are free (subject to the National Treatment and
MFN obligations of TRIPs) to determine the criteria or conditions for
someone to be an ‘‘owner’’ of a patent, this has major implications for the
ability of developing countries, for instance, to insure that patent protec-
tion does not conflict with their development needs.11 Technology trans-
fer, acceptance of price controls, etc. could all be imposed as conditions
for an entity to be recognized as an ‘‘owner’’ of a patent, and thereby the
beneficiary of the rights enumerated in TRIPs 28.1.
In sum, the finding of the Appellate Body concerning the significance
of ownership not being defined or specified in TRIPs with respect to
trademarks has significant promise for rebalancing the TRIPs Agreement
in a manner conducive to answering many of the critiques of TRIPs by
developing country activists and governments. The problem is that the
AB’s approach reposes on an erroneous interpretation of TRIPs 16.1 – an
interpretation that ignores the fundamental structure and nature of the
obligation in 16.1 as an obligation of recognition and enforcement of
substantive rights established before the authorities of another
jurisdiction.
TRIPs Article 42
Article 42 requires that WTO Members afford to holders of intellectual
property rights ‘‘civil judicial procedures concerning the enforcement of
any intellectual property right covered by this agreement.’’ Article 42 goes
11 At the same time, depriving a foreign economic actor of the status of ‘‘owner’’ of certain
intellectual property rights might constitute, for example, a violation of the customary
international law of investor protection, and in some cases might violate provisions of
trade or bilateral investment treaties, depending on how they are worded. There could be
circumstances where a deprivation of ‘‘owner’’ status for example might be considered
an ‘‘expropriation’’ or a denial of ‘‘full protection and security.’’
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on to stipulate certain minimum level of due process to which ‘‘right
holders’’ are entitled.
The EC argued that the US legislation in dispute took away this
entitlement from Pernod, by essentially taking away from it the status of
a ‘‘rights holder.’’ Thus, the legislation, while not taking away the standing
of someone claiming to be a ‘‘rights holder’’ to assert their substantive
claim, would allow that claim to be defeated such that the court might
never get to the application of the general provisions of trademark law,
including those in TRIPs.
The AB rightly held that the legislation went to the substantive not
procedural validity of trademark claims, and therefore did not violate the
procedural rights in Article 42. While a US court might, as a matter of
judicial economy, rule against the substantive claim of a trademark holder
on the basis of the legislation in dispute, without going on to consider the
merits of the claim otherwise, the AB held that to do so did not violate any
of the procedural rights in Article 42; nothing in the legislation in dispute
authorized or mandated the US courts not to apply the guarantees of fair
procedure in the Rules of Evidence and federal civil procedure legislation.
Only after determining, on the basis of rules of fair procedure, that a right
holder did not ‘‘own’’ the mark in question, would a court, on the basis of
the legislation in dispute, find its claim to be invalid.
Paris Convention Article 8
Article 8 of the Paris Convention provides that ‘‘A trade name shall be
protected in all the countries of the Union without the obligation of filing
or registration, whether or not it forms part of a trademark.’’ Article 8 is
one of the provisions of the Paris Convention incorporated into TRIPs by
virtue of TRIPs Article 2.1. Article 2.1, however, states that this incorp-
oration is ‘‘in respect of Parts II, III and IV of TRIPs.’’ Since trade names
are not dealt with as a separate kind of intellectual property from trade-
marks in Part II of TRIPs, the panel held that Paris Convention Article 8
was not incorporated into TRIPs; it interpreted the words ‘‘in respect
of . . .’’ as limited or circumscribing the scope of the incorporation of the
Paris Convention into TRIPs. Both the US and the EU appealed this
finding, which the panel also sought to sustain by reference to the
negotiating history of TRIPs.
The Appellate Body correctly observed that Article 8 – which deals with
trade names exclusively – was explicitly chosen as among those articles
mentioned in 2.1. If would be nonsensical to include Article 8 in the list of
Articles of the Paris Convention incorporated in TRIPs, and then
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completely nullify the incorporation by virtue of the language ‘‘in respect
of . . .’’ The AB found that the language ‘‘in respect of . . .’’ could be given
a meaning that would avoid this result.
Here, the AB was, we believe, on solid ground. The principle of effect-
iveness in treaty interpretation requires that the interpreter seek a mean-
ing that gives effect to all of the relevant treaty provisions, and to do so
before claiming a contradiction or ambiguity that would justify recourse
to the negotiating history.
As the AB suggested, the language ‘‘in respect of . . .’’ need not mean
that a form of intellectual property protection dealt with in an incorpor-
ated provision of the Paris Convention need appear in the titles or
headings of Parts II, III or IV of TRIPs. As the AB observed, the Patents
section of TRIPs refers to a sui generis system of intellectual property as an
alternative to patentability in the case of plant varieties. Such an provision
could not be defeated just because there is no heading in Part II of TRIPs
on sui generis patent protection.
In the case of trade names, Article 16.1 of TRIPs makes it clear that a
mark may not be denied protection because it consists merely of words,
including personal names. To this extent, Part II of TRIPs does protect
trade names, either as marks or part of marks. The fact that none of
the substantive provisions in TRIPs Part II mentions trade names as a
distinct form of intellectual property may well be because the drafters
considered the protection provided to trade names as distinct from marks
in Article 8 of the Paris Convention to be sufficient. The incorporation of
Paris Convention Article 8 might well be the reason why it was not
necessary to deal with trade names independently of marks in Part II;
thus, to defeat the incorporation of Paris Convention Article 8 into TRIPs
on the grounds that trade names are not mentioned separately in Part II
would be utterly perverse. These considerations, in our view, provide
strong support for the Appellate Body’s decision to reverse the panel, and
find that Article 8 of the Paris Convention is indeed incorporated into
TRIPs.
Having so decided, it should be noted, the AB chose not to exercise its
discretion to complete the analysis, the panel having not made any
findings of fact concerning the claims on trade names (since the panel
viewed them as excluded from TRIPs altogether). It is likely, based on its
interpretations of other provisions of TRIPs and the Paris Convention in
this ruling that the AB would have found Article 8 to be largely, if not
entirely, procedural in character, stating only that protection of trade
names may not depend on the prior formalities of filing and registration,
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but without specifying when and at what level Members are required to
provide substantive protection to trade names.
National Treatment and MFN
TRIPs incorporates the National Treatment obligation of the Paris
Convention Article 2(1), which states: ‘‘Nationals of any country of the
Union shall, as regards the protection of industrial property, enjoy in the
other countries of the Union the advantages that their respective laws now
grant, or may hereafter grant to nationals.’’
With respect to successors-in-interest, those who acquire a trademark
from the original owner, the contested US legislation on Havana Club
proved that US courts shall not recognize, enforce or validate any rights
by a ‘‘designated national’’ (where of course the trademark was at one time
the property of a confiscated entity); ‘‘designated national’’ is defined in
the Regulations pursuant to the legislation not only as Cuba or any Cuban
national of any foreign country (that is, non-United States nations) who
are successors-in-interest to a designated national.
The United States persuaded the panel that although these provisions
explicitly barred certain foreign nationals only from the assertion of trade-
mark rights in the US Courts, in practice there was no denial of National
Treatment, since it was also the consistent practice of the US authorities
to deny recognition of these rights where held by US nationals, and since
there were other statutory and international law bars to the recognition of
rights acquired in connection with confiscated property, which would
equally function as a bar to US nationals and foreign nationals attempting
to assert such rights in the US courts, quite apart from the legislation
being challenged in Havana Club.
The Appellate Body reversed, finding that the Havana Club legislation
constituted an additional hurdle to the recognition of trademark rights
that was imposed only on certain foreign nationals, but not on US
nationals. While the AB recognized that there were serious obstacles
faced by US nationals in the same situation, there remained a hypothetical
possibility that these might be overcome in a given case, resulting in better
treatment of the US national in question, in relation to the foreign
national who would, in like circumstances, now face the additional
obstacle in the Havana Club legislation.
The AB ruling seems to be a relatively straightforward application of
the spirit and letter of the GATT S. 337 panel ruling; there, the panel
suggested that in cases of explicitly different, and prima facie less favor-
able, treatment of foreign products in a particular law, in order for the
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defendant to successfully claim that a full comparison of the overall
treatment of the relevant foreign products shows that the latter are not
discriminated against, there must be certainty that, in every instance, the
factors extrinsic to the particular legal provisions being challenged would
fully balance or neutralize any less favorable treatment that would result
from those particular legal provisions. This seems a heavy burden tomeet,
but again it must be recognized that here, in Havana Club, as in 337,
foreigners were being singled out explicitly and categorically in the law
itself.
With respect to original owners of trademarks attempting to assert
their rights in the United States, the Appellate Body found that if there
were ‘‘two separate owners who acquired rights, either at common law or
based on registration, in two separate United States trademarks before the
Cuban confiscation occurred’’ and these trademarks were the same as or
similar to a Cuban trademark used in connection with a business that was
confiscated, and the one owner was American and the other Cuban, only
the Cuban national would be affected by the regime in the Havana Club
legislation. Thus, again there was explicit discrimination against foreign,
in this case Cuban, nationals.
The United States pointed out however that the Havana Club legisla-
tion did not apply to trademarks registered in the United States prior to
the existence of Section 515.527 of the CACR. The AB responded that this
‘‘does not address the discrimination against Cuban nationals who are
original owners of trademark rights in the United States based on common
law.’’
Unlike with respect to successors-in-interest, where it is obvious that
all designated foreign nationals face at least an additional formal hurdle
under the Havana Club legislation, the discrimination discerned by the
AB in the case of original owners seems to depend entirely upon a
hypothetical, i.e. the existence of a class of persons, Cuban nationals
who are original owners of trademarks rights in the United States based
on common law, which trademarks are the same or similar to trademarks
used by businesses then confiscated by Cuba. Finding less favorable
treatment of foreigners based upon an entirely hypothetical situation of
certain (possibly non-existent foreigners) in relation to US nationals,
seems at odds with the AB ruling in Canada – Periodicals, where the AB
faulted the panel for basing its analysis of National Treatment on com-
parisons based on purely hypothetical situations.
In addition, Cuba was not a party to theHavana Club litigation and the
question arises as to the appropriateness of the AB’s implicit conclusion
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that the obligation of National Treatment towards Cuban nationals is one
that the United States owes to the EC or the entire WTOMembership not
just to Cuba. The AB did not even address the question of whether or not
National Treatment, in TRIPs or the Paris Convention, is an obligation of
that nature, i.e. erga omnes partes. (See Pauwellyn, 2002). Certainly, if one
were to view National Treatment in these instruments as a kind of lex
specialis of the law on the treatment of aliens, there would be a strong
presumption against erga omnes partes, because, traditionally under the
law of protection of aliens, only the state of which the alien is a national
can assert a claim against another state based on its treatment of that alien.
Matters in Havana Club may not be that simple, however, because the
meaning of ‘‘Cuban national’’ seems to extend to persons who were
Cuban nationals and are currently residing outside of Cuba in third
countries, including possibly the EC. From the perspective of the
National Treatment obligation, these persons might well be properly
considered EC ‘‘nationals’’ even if they might fall within the definition
of ‘‘Cuban national’’ in the statute.
This brings us in fact to the MFN violation claimed by the EC. In the
case of original owners, the Havana Club legislation, by singling out
Cuban nationals (not other foreign nationals as is the case with the
legislation as it applies to successors-in-interest) discriminates between
Cuban nationals and original owners from other WTO Members. The
United States responded that a Cuban original owner could be
‘‘unblocked’’ under different legislation; however, the AB pointed out
that 1) only Cuban nationals resident in the US were automatically
‘‘unblocked’’; 2) Cuban nationals resident in Cuba cannot be unblocked;
3) Cuban nationals resident in the EC may be ‘‘unblocked’’ but must
go through an additional procedure. The difference in treatment between
2 and 3 does in fact show racial discrimination of a kind prohibited by
the MFN obligation. But the worse treatment of Cuban nationals residing
in the EC than Cuban nationals residing in the US, 1 and 3, arguably
illustrates why it might have been reasonable for the AB to find a National
Treatment violation in respect of treatment of original owners, even
without Cuba being a litigant, or without directly addressing the issue
of erga omnes partes.
National Treatment and mutual recognition As discussed above, the
AB ruling confirms the importance of National Treatment in the TRIPs. It
also takes the view that mutual recognition of intellectual property rights
should not go beyond the form in which it was filed.
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This section discusses how National Treatment affects the incentive to
set intellectual property rights and the extent to which it improves
efficiency. We also consider the incentives that mutual recognition
would trigger and compare the outcomes arising out of national treat-
ment and mutual recognition.
In order to discuss this issue, we develop a framework that can deal
with patents and copyrights as well as trademarks. As discussed above,
trademarks, unlike patents, do not involve important public good aspects.
In the context of the framework that we develop below, this will generally
yield a higher level of protection for trademarks, relative to innovations.
But the essential ingredients of the model remain the same. The case of
trademark can thus be obtained as a special case, in which the balance
between the marginal cost and the marginal benefit of extending IP
protection yields a high level of protection.
As indicated above, the external effects across jurisdiction may also be
less pronounced in the case of trademarks than in the case of patents. This
arises because trademark protection in one country, which allows for the
profitable sale of a particular product item, will not yield benefit to
foreign consumers. Trademark protection in the foreign country will
be necessary in order to trigger profitable sales abroad. In the case of
innovation, once produced, it will be sold abroad even if there is no
protection. In other words, benefits abroad are not contingent on the
existence of IP protection abroad for domestic products.
However, the absence of one external effect across jurisdictions will not
change qualitatively the results discussed below. Domestic governments
will still have less of an incentive to grant IP protection to foreign firms
than domestic firms and the effect of both national treatment and mutual
recognition will be qualitatively unchanged. In what follows, we will refer
to the broader framework, involving IP rights and innovations, keeping in
mind that trademarks can be obtained as a special case.
We find that National Treatment effectively pools incentives with
respect to domestic and foreign innovations. It prevents government
from discriminating between IP rights with different perceived returns
and as a consequence leads to a sharp fall on the IP rights granted to
domestic firms. We find that National Treatment is unlikely to improve
much over the uncoordinated outcome in which each government sets
different IP rights for domestic and foreign innovation. By contrast, we
find that mutual recognition has attractive features; in a symmetric
environment (where countries have the same size), mutual recognition
actually achieves the outcome that would be selected by a central
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government, which internalizes all external effects across countries. This
arises because under mutual recognition, a domestic government induces
the foreign government to select towards domestic firms the IP policy that
it would have selected if it had internalized external effects across
countries.
At first glance, the fact that National Treatment does not seem very
efficient may come as a surprise, given that national treatment is often
considered as a reference in the area of non-tariff barriers (Art. III). This
may reinforce the extent to which National Treatment should be seen in
the context of the Trademark provisions of TRIPs as part of a lex specialis
with respect to the fair and non-discriminatory treatment of aliens, rather
than a mechanism for insuring welfare maximizing levels of trademark
protection.
Hence, before considering in detail how different regimes will affect IP
rights, we briefly compare the effect of National Treatment in the area of
non-tariff barriers (Art. III) and the area of intellectual property rights.
(i) National Treatment: NTBs versus IP rights
Let us first consider National Treatment in the area of NTBs, for
instance a product regulation, which raises the costs of foreign
firms, relative to those of domestic firms. Such barriers can be attract-
ive for the domestic government to the extent that they affected the
competition between domestic and foreign firms and reallocated rents
in favor of domestic firms.
As is well known from the literature on strategic trade policy, the
governments involved (assumed to maximize domestic welfare) face
an incentive structure, which conforms to a prisoner’s dilemma – in
which the dominant strategy is to introduce product regulations
which favor domestic firms. The outcome is inefficient, and both
countries are worse off relative to the situation where neither country
introduces non-tariff barriers.
In this instance, the source of the inefficiency is the
(pecuniary) external effect that the introduction of a non-tariff barrier
imposes on the profits of the foreign firms. This external effect is not
internalized by the governments involved. A treaty between govern-
ments which bans the implementation of the non tariff barriers will also
naturally remove the inefficiency but it will require a strongmechanism
of compliance as the government will always have an incentive to
introduce such non-tariff barriers, in the hope that they will remain
unnoticed or fall through the cracks of the legal system.
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Let us now consider the recognition of intellectual property rights.
The recognition of intellectual property rights to foreign firms has two
aspects: first, by granting intellectual property rights to foreign firms,
the domestic government will again affect the allocation of rents
between domestic and foreign firms, as long as domestic and foreign
products associated with the intellectual property rights are not inde-
pendent. If these products compete,12 by granting intellectual prop-
erty rights to foreign firms, domestic governments will make foreign
products less attractive – as domestic users will have to pay some
royalties. This will also increase the profits of domestic firms, so that
the rents to both domestic and foreign firms will increase. Such a
policy may thus only be attractive to the domestic government if it
gives an important weight to profits – relative to consumer surplus. In
what follows, we will mostly abstract from this first aspect of intellec-
tual property rights.
The second aspect is associated with the design of an intellectual
property policy. The design of intellectual property rights strikes a
balance between the distortion that they involve with respect to exist-
ing products and the benefit that would accrue from additional
innovations (see Nordhaus, 1969). In evaluating the distortion that
intellectual property will impose on domestic products, a domestic
government will only consider the deadweight loss. In other words,
it will consider the profit to domestic firms as a transfer from con-
sumers. However, with respect to the intellectual property rights
granted to foreign firms, foreign profits will not be counted as part
of the country’s welfare and hence the cost of an increase in price
associated with an intellectual property regime will include the entire
reduction in consumer surplus. Hence, the domestic government will
have less of an incentive to grant intellectual property rights to foreign
firms relative to domestic firms. As in the case of non-tariff barriers,
the external effect that the domestic policy has on foreign profits is not
internalized.
With respect to the benefit of intellectual property rights, a national
government considering new domestic innovation will only take into
account the benefit accruing to domestic consumers (at the margin a
new innovation will yield no profit). It will neglect the external effect
to foreign consumers. Similarly, in considering the benefit that might
12 The opposite would occur if products are complement.
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accrue from extending intellectual property rights to foreign firms, a
domestic government will only consider the benefit that will accrue to
domestic consumers.
Overall, in designing an intellectual property regime for domestic
firms, a domestic government will fail to consider benefits accruing to
foreign consumers and hence will provide excessively low protection
to domestic innovations. This bias in favour of excessively low protec-
tion will persist in designing intellectual property for foreign firms; in
addition, when it comes to foreign firms, the cost of intellectual
property will be biased upwards as foreign profits will not be consid-
ered. This will reinforce the bias in favor of excessively low protection
towards foreign firms.
Let us now consider national treatment, whereby domestic govern-
ments commit to provide to foreign firms the treatment that they
provide to domestic firms. As observed by Scotchmer (2002), national
governments have little incentive to adopt this policy unilaterally: the
additional profits that they would grant to foreign firms is unlikely to
be compensated by the domestic benefit that would accrue from the
development of new products abroad, at least if the domestic country
is relatively small. This will also arise independently of whether foreign
countries have themselves adopted a regime of national treatment. As
in the case of non-tariff barriers, the uncoordinated outcome will thus
involve insufficient protection of foreign firms and the implementa-
tion of a regime of national treatment will require a strong compliance
mechanism.
The question of the extent to which National Treatment will
improve efficiency is less clear-cut. National treatment effectively
ensures that intellectual property rights are the same for domestic
and foreign firms – despite the fact that underlying incentives are
different for foreign and domestic firms. It does not directly address
the underlying sources of inefficiencies either. A policy addressing the
external effects would have to ensure that national governments con-
sider the profit accruing to foreign firms when intellectual property
rights are raised and consider the benefits to foreign consumers from
new innovations. National Treatment does not do either of these. It
imposes the same IP rights on both domestic and foreign firms.
These consequences will be discussed in more detail below. At this
stage, it is worth emphasizing that the analysis of national treatment
should not be imported from the area of non-tariff barriers (Art. III)
to that of TRIPs. If the incentives faced by governments with respect to
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the imposition of non-tariff barriers and with respect to the extension
of intellectual property rights to foreign firms are similar, the parallel
should not be extended further. Whereas NTBs have to do with the
allocation of rents between firms, the extension of intellectual prop-
erty rights to foreign firms has to do with the provision of public
goods (in a second best world). National treatment can be expected
to have different consequences in these two environments.
(ii) A simple model of innovation and trade
In order to investigate some of the properties of the outcomes
induced by national treatment and mutual recognition, we will
develop a simple benchmark model of trade and innovation. This
benchmark model will abstract from many issues and in particular
will assume that products developed domestically and abroad are
independent. More precisely, any product developed in one country
will have a market in both domestic and foreign countries and will
not compete with other existing or future innovation. In addition,
countries will not ‘‘compete’’ with respect to the development of
innovations. Each country can be thought of as being completely
specialized in a particular innovation segment.13 This model thus
abstracts from all issues of rivalry between innovations (both within
and across countries) to focus on the issue of coordination between
countries in the provision of public goods.
Both Scotchmer (2002) and Grossman and Lai (2002) have ana-
lyzed the non-cooperative choice of IP policies under national treat-
ment. They consider richer models in which innovations compete
(Grossman and Lai (2002)) or in which countries face a coordination
problem in the development of new innovations (Scotchmer (2002)).
These authors however focus on the interplay between countries in
defining their IP policies under national treatment and do not
attempt to evaluate national treatment relative to other policy
regimes.
There are two countries, 1 and 2. There is a technology, common
to both countries such that new products can be designed at a cost k
where k is uniformly distributed in the 0; 1½  interval and such that for
each cost k there is a density  ¼ 1 of new products that can produced
(the set of potential innovation is thus given by 0; 1½   0; 1½ . If the
13 Alternatively, one can think of this model as describing an environment where there are
innovation races for each product across countries and in which each country has an
intrinsic advantage in developing a range of innovations.
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two countries develop innovations simultaneously in the same cost
range, each country will obtain a share i of the corresponding
innovations (with 1 þ 2 ¼ 1). These shares might be thought of
as reflecting the relative efficiency of the two countries in developing
new products.
In each country, there is a demand for each new product which is
denoted Pi ¼ ai  Qi; all products are independent (neither substi-
tute, nor complement) and once developed can be produced at
constant (zero) marginal cost.
An IP policy towards innovators selling products in country i can
then bemodeled as a level of rent,i. In turn, in the absence of rivalry
between innovations, any level of rent can be determined by a price
level Pi, wherei ¼ Piðai  PiÞ, so that an IP policy can be seen as the
choice of a particular price level for each new product. Note that
profits can be seen as discounted flows over time so that the choice of
a particular price level can also be interpreted as a patent length (an
increase in the patent length will increase profits and the deadweight
loss and reduce consumer surplus).
Each country’s government will select at most two IP policies, one
towards domestic innovations and one towards foreign innovations.
We denote ~Pi as the IP policy of country i, which applies to its
domestic innovators, whereas yi will denote the IP policy which
applies to foreign innovators.
There is free entry in the production of innovation so that any
innovation which is profitable is produced. The range of innovations
which takes place is thus determined by the flow of profits which
arise from IP rights in both countries (that is from IP rights granted to
domestic firms by the domestic government and the IP rights granted
to the same firms by the foreign government). Let us denote kið~Pi; yjÞ
as the marginal innovation in country i. This marginal innovation
is determined by the level of profits accruing from both domestic
and foreign IP rights, with kið~Pi; yjÞ ¼ ~Piðai  ~PiÞ þ yjðaj  yjÞ.14 The
range of innovation which is produced in country i is thus given by
0; kið~Pi; yjÞ
 
.
LetCSð~PiÞ and DWLð~PiÞ denote respectively the consumer surplus
and deadweight loss that accrue as a function of a domestic IP policy
14 We assume that there is no arbitrage across countries so that the demands for any given
products are independent across countries.
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in country i. Standard calculation yields that
CSð~PiÞ ¼ ðai 
~PiÞ2
2
;DWLð~PiÞ
¼
~P2i
2
; and CSð~PiÞ þ DWLð~PiÞ þið~PiÞ ¼ a
2
i
2
The same expression applies, mutatis mutandis, for IP rights granted
to foreign firms.
We consider four policy regimes: first, we derive the choice of an
optimal IP policy by each country, with respect to domestic and
foreign firms, in the absence of any coordination. Second, we con-
sider the choice of an IP policy under national treatment (whereby
domestic and foreign firms have to be treated alike). Third, we
consider the choice of an IP policy under mutual recognition
(whereby foreign firms have to be treated in the same way as in
their domestic base). For reference, we also derive the policy that
would be chosen by a central authority, which internalizes all exter-
nal effects across countries.
(iii) Independent IP policies
As shown by Nordhaus (1969) (see also Grossman and Lai (2002)),
the optimal choice of an IP policy (or patent length) will balance the
benefit from new innovations with the distortions that the IP policy
implies ex post on existing products, as long as profits are considered
as transfer from consumer to firms. This condition will thus deter-
mine the IP policies towards domestic firms. Given the behavior of
innovators (such that all innovations which yield a positive profit are
undertaken), the benefit associated with new innovations is solely the
consumer surplus that it will yield ex post.
By contrast, the optimal IP policy towards foreign innovators will
balance the benefit from additional innovation abroad (for domestic
consumers) with the fall in consumer surplus on existing foreign
innovations. In this case, the profit, which accrues to foreign firms, is
not counted as part of domestic welfare.
The condition for the optimal domestic IP policy in country i can
then be written:
CSð~PiÞ @
~ki
@~Pi
 @DWLð
~PiÞ
@~Pi
kið~Pi; yjÞ ¼ 0; i ¼ 1; 2 (1)
The first term represents the benefit that is obtained from increasing
IP rights in terms of additional consumer surplus. The second term
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represents the cost in terms of increasing the deadweight loss on
existing products. Note that this formulation assumes that profits
and consumer surplus are equally weighted by the government (so
that the change in the sum of consumer surplus and profit is equal to
the opposite of the change in the deadweight loss).
The condition for the optimal IP policy in country i toward
foreign firms can be written;
CSðyiÞ @kj
@yi
 @CSðyiÞ
@yi
kjð~Pj; yiÞ ¼ 0; i ¼ 1; 2 (2)
The uncoordinated outcome can then be derived by solving the four
equations given in (1)–(2). It is easy to check that these conditions
yield downward sloping reactions functions, such that the IP rights
granted to domestic firms will fall as the IP rights that they obtain
abroad increase. As one would expect, the IP rights granted to foreign
firms are always less than those granted to domestic innovators. For
the sake of illustration, table 1 reports the optimal IP rights, when
markets are symmetric (with ai ¼ 1; i ¼ 1; 2) and in the case where
market 1 is larger, a1 ¼ 1:25; a2 ¼ 1.
The comparison between asymmetric and symmetric outcomes
confirms that large countries have a stronger incentive to grant
property rights to foreign firms – simply because they have a stronger
effect in triggering marginal innovations.
Table 1 also reports the range of innovation that is undertaken in
each country (k*) in equilibrium, as well as the level of welfare, for
further reference.
(iv) National Treatment
Under National Treatment, domestic and foreign firms have to be
treated alike. In other words, we have that ~Pi ¼ yi; i ¼ 1; 2. The
Table 1. Independent IP policies
a1¼ a2¼ 1 a1¼ 1:25; a2¼ 1
P1 0.301 0.401
y1 0.129 0.215
P2 0.301 0.276
y2 0.129 0.067
k* 0.323
W 0.259
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optimal IP right in country i will then balance the benefit for
domestic consumers of additional innovations at home plus the
benefit for domestic customers of additional innovations induced
abroad with the deadweight loss on existing innovations at home and
the loss of (domestic) consumer surplus on existing innovations
from abroad.
The condition for an optimal IP policy under national treatment is
then written:
CSð~PiÞ @ki
@~Pi
 @DWLð
~PiÞ
@~Pi
kið~Pi; ~PjÞ þ CSð~PiÞ @kj
@~Pi
 @CSð
~PiÞ
@~Pi
kjð~Pj; ~PiÞ¼ 0; i ¼ 1; 2
The reactions functions implicitly defined by these equations
are downward sloping. One can also check that the equilibrium
IP rights which solve these two equations are in between the
domestic and foreign IP rights defined above under the assumption
that IP policies are independent. To illustrate, assuming that
countries are symmetric (with ai ¼ 1; i ¼ 1; 2), one obtains that
~Pi ¼ 5=4
ﬃﬃ
1
p
7=4 ’ 0:219. In the context of this example, the
level of innovation which is undertaken and the welfare are given
by : k ¼ 0:342;W ¼ 0:267.
The comparison between the outcomes under independent IP
policies and national treatment is striking. Under national treatment,
government has to offer the same rights to domestic and foreign
innovators despite the fact that IP rights to the latter yield much
lower perceived returns. As a consequence, the marginal returns
from IP rights fall relative to marginal returns from domestic rights.
The aggregate right increases only marginally and as a consequence,
the range of innovation hardly increases. The level of welfare is also
barely changed.
One should possibly not pay toomuch attention to the results that
aggregate IP rights, the range of innovation and welfare do not
change significantly with national treatment, relative to the independ-
ent solution, as these results are likely affected by the shape of the
demand function. However, the observation that national treatment
is ineffective because it prevents government from discriminating
between IP rights with different perceived returns and as a conse-
quence leads to a sharp fall on the IP rights granted to domestic firms
deserves attention.
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(v) Mutual recognition
In a regime of mutual recognition, the domestic government has to
grant to foreign firms the same treatment that they receive at home.
In the context of our model, this implies that yi ¼ ~Pj; i ¼ 1; 2. In this
environment, national government can effectively make sure that the
same IP rights are granted to domestic innovators, irrespective of
where the innovation is sold. Unlike what happens under national
treatment, domestic government cannot affect the profitability of
foreign innovations but rather raise contributions to domestic innov-
ations from foreigners.
The optimal IP right will then balance the benefit of additional
innovations at home with the deadweight loss on existing innov-
ations, taking into account that an increase in domestic IP rights will
be matched by an increase in foreign IP rights on domestic innov-
ations. The condition for optimal IP rights is then written:
CSð~PiÞ @kið
~Pi; yjÞ
@~Pi yj¼~Pij
 @DWLð
~PiÞ
@~Pi
kið~Pi; yjÞ yj¼~Pij ¼ 0
Interestingly, this condition is equivalent to the condition for opti-
mal IP rights that would be chosen by a government which considers
all external effects across markets, when the markets are symmetric.
This condition can be written as:
2CSð~PÞ @kð
~PÞ
@~P
 2 @DWLð
~PÞ
@~P
kð~PÞ ¼ 0
When markets are symmetric, we have that @kð~PÞ=@~P ¼
@kið~Pi; yjÞ=@~Pi yj¼~Pij and kð~PÞ ¼ kið~Pi; yjÞ yj¼~Pij so that the two condi-
tions are equivalent.
To illustrate, assuming that countries are symmetric (with
ai ¼ 1; i ¼ 1; 2), one obtains that under mutual recognition (and
the fully coordinated solution) ~Pi ¼ 1=3. The level of innovation
which is undertaken and the welfare are then given by:
k ¼ 0:44;W ¼ 0:296.
The intuition behind the effectiveness of mutual recognition can
be expressed as follows: mutual recognition forces the foreign coun-
try to adopt the same IP protection towards domestic firms. But in a
symmetric world, the level of protection that the foreign country is
‘‘forced’’ to adopt is also the level of IP protection that foreigners
should have adopted if they were taking external effects into account.
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Hence, mutual recognition effectively mimics the outcome that
would be chosen by a central authority.
One can also expect that in an asymmetric world, the equivalence
will no longer hold. Presumably, large countries will induce smaller
ones to choose an IP policy which is more extensive than what they
would choose if they were taking external effects into account and
vice versa. This could lead to excessively broad protection in large
countries and excessively low protection in small ones.
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